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MICRODATA: LESSONS FROM THE SF0 AND THE GRAE)IJATED
WORK INCENTIVE EXPERIMENT*
BY HAROLD V. WATTS
Recent and revolutionary advances in data processing and computing machinery,
combined with expanding bodies of data and increasing numbers of analysts
with basic quantitative skills, have led to the view that we are entering a new era
of social analysis. There is also a new urgency to tackle the many tough social
problems that can only be solved by analysis at the micro-unit level, which may
well lead people toneedsuch a new era in data colkction whether or not it is
actually round the corner.
There is not, in fact, very much evidence in the form of completed research
that the vast potential created by these advances in computer technology is yet
being exploited. From myOWUexperience in this area, I have developed a view
as to why this is so, and in this note indicate that there are very difficult and un-
solved problems involved in harnessing these resources, and that these problems
are peculiar to the collection, storage, and usage of "micro" data.
Micro data are collected from direct surveys of individual units rather than
from the putting together of many subsets of secondary information into large-
scale aggregates. And it is not at all unlikely that such direct data collection may
be relatively more feasible in Latin America than in fully industrialized countries
like the United States, because substitutes for such statistics are harder to come by
and less reliable.
The remainder of this paper will be organized in the following way. After
defining in more detail what I mean by "micro-data," I shall recount two specific
episodes in which I have been involved because they illustrate the problems of
such undertakings; then I shall draw a few conclusions and give my advice about
what criteria should guide the setting up of generally usable systems to handle
such data.
MICRO DATA
Micro-economic data are here taken to be information pertaining to, and
unique to, specific decision-making units. These may be individuals, families, firms,
political units, and so on. The data may be cross-sectional------giving information
on a unit's status at a point in time (or for one period of time), or they may provide
information referring to (or collected at) several successive points in time. The
* I would like to acknowledge here the editorial skills of Felicity Skidinore which made my
disjointed thoughts into a paper. This paper was presented under the title "Micro-economic Data
Banks: Problems and Potential," at the Conference on the Computer in Economic and Social Research
in Latin America, October 1971, Cuernevaca, Mexico.
183full complexity of suchdata is reached whenthe informationis collectedfor a series of points in time. Aperson is indivisible for thesepurposes; he is.however, born and he does die, And,the decision units ofwhich heis a part can alsochange from one survey to another.l'his process ofbirth. death, andmutation oimu1(- person uiiits-----is what makes itdifficult to organize,store, and workwith micro- data. Different analysesare likely to apply todifferent decisionunits oreven different versions of whatis nominally thesame unit. Thus, choicesof definition have to be made, and thequestions of how unitsare to be matched,put together, followed fromsurvey to survey, dependon these choices.
To be useful for analysis,collections of micro-datashould provideinput for research that is timely,and also responsiveto importantareas ofuncertainty. There is now inoperation computingand file-manipulatingmachinery thatis enormously powerful andbecoming steadily lesscostly. OperatingSystems and program libraries also reflecta high degree ofdevelopment, andare still active areas for innovation. Andthere is a widerange of storagemediacards,tapes, disks, drumsandon the horizon areeven more exotic andcompact media. Finally, there isa growing inventory ofdata born ofa recognition thatmany questions requiredetailed informationon families or other
decision-making units, including dataon how variables forspecific unitshave changedover time. Why have theseresources not been exploitedmore fully? Whyhave the theory and practiceof social andeconomic systemsbeen able todraw on themto such a limited extent?The answermay lie along thefollowing lines.The organiza- tional effort and thebudget requiredto join all thesecomponents togetherinto a working systemare beyond the capacityof individualresearchers. Suchresearchers are, therefore, ledto ignore micro-dataand devote theirefforts tomore tradi- tional, heavilyworked over,manageablesources of data.' At theother extreme, research groups withgenerous resources havebeen workingtoward generating the super-colossaltype of micro-databank that aimsat buildingup to a level of generality which isalmost if notcompletely impossiblegiven thecurrent state of the art.
The next twosections describethe problemsencountered intwo relatively modest micro-datagathering efforts,to lend somerealism to thediscussion of massivegeneral-purpose databanks, and togive some ideaof the magnitudeof the problemswhich must beovercome beforewe can hope tooperationalize such a concept.
The Surveyof EconomicOpporiuniii'
When PresidentJohnson's Waron Poverty wasdeclared, certainantipoverty governmentprograms wereinitiated by theOffice ofEconomic Opportunity (OEO). it didnot take long forthe researchstaff of theagency to realize thatnot very much wasknown aboutthe characteristicsof thepoor in the UnitedStates,
and even lessabout the impactthat OEO'sactionprograms might behaving on those poorpeople. Itwas, therefore,decided to getnew data on thesequestions by administeringa survey toa large numberof families(30,000). Low-income F. ThomasJustcr, "Microdata,
Economic Research,and (he Productionof Economic Know-
ledge," .4?n&jcanEcno,njc Rptieiv,May 1910.
184census tracts were sampled morethan proportionally because of thecentral pur-
pose of the survey. All thedwelling units were interviewed in early1966 and a
subset of them were interviewed againin early 1967. along with a new(inde-
pendently drawn) subsample to make upthe same total.
Since OEO did not have the machinery toundertake the survey themsefcs.
they contracted with the Census Bureauto do it for them. However, inaddition
to providing up-to-dateinformation on the ten-ongoing poverty programs.the
SF0 was also designed toprovide a data base for morefundamental analytic
studies of the social process thatproduces and perpetuates poverty.The instru-
ment. therefore, included abroader set of household variables thanhad been
traditional in Census surveys.
Although the interviews took place in1966 and 1967, it is only withinthe
past year that any volume of analyticwork has been produced using thesedata,
and the longitudinal subsamplehas not yet been exploited on awide scale. Also.
when the basic information onsize and status of various partsof the poverty
population were initially pulledtogether and made available theyconflicted with
other sources, producinginconsistencies that have yet to besatisfactorily and
completely resolved. Why the three-yearlag--which was totally unpredictedby
the planners and was neverrecognized as inevitable even when thedata were being
processed
The first data tapes weremade available (from the initial. 1966 surveywave)
by the Census Bureau in lateSpring of 1967. This was muchlater than everyone
had expected for the resultsof the first cross-section.Indeed there had been plans
to use its results toguide the second wave administeredin the first months of 1967.
The fielding and administeringof the questionnaires caused noapparent
problem; but reliable transcriptionof the data from the questionnairesinto
analyzable form proved intractable to adegree which was a completesurprise to
the Census Bureauhardly anovice at large-scale data collection.
The problem centered on thefact that the Census organization wasgeared to
the ordinary operationof a multi-program.data-production system that was
completely routinized. Theadaptation of this system to adifferent task proved
unexpectedly difficult even forexperienced technicians. Mostprominently, the
variables which were unique tothe Survey of EconomicOpportunity required
both new cooceptual workand new computerprOgrammin1gwork before the
data could he edited andchecked, and before missing itemscould be accounted
for and allocated.
In fact the Census Bureaudivided the task.__proceSSingthemselves the part
which could use the existingroutines for the CurrentPopulation Survey (C.P.S.).
and subcontracting (toARIES Corporation) the new orunique segments. Unfor-
tunately the coded identifiersfor individual families werenot always unique so
that it proved impossible to putthe two segments backtogether for some of the
households. This error was notdiscovered until the Fall of1967 after a substantial
amount of effort had beenspent on further "datacleaning."
But there was a secondmajor problem as well,connected with the problem of
making data in unaggregatedform available toresearchers. Providingso-called
"raw" data was not somethingthe U.S. Census Bureauhad done routinely or
comfortably. They observe '-ryhigh standards for allstatistical products mane
185asailable for generalconsumption. Theirsense of responsibilitymayeven he said to have developed to the pointwhere, in their eflortsto preclude allpossibility of foolish or perverseinterpretation of theirstatistics, theypreventIflterpretatj1of any kind. This instance provedno exception. Theywere extremelyuneasy about releasing micro-dataeven to OEO (whichcommissioned them)for fear ofthe multifarious uses to whichthey might conceivablybe put. Their discomfiturewas enhanced by anotherdimension totheprobleni, Many of the analysesanticipated for theSEO datainvolved
multi-variable regression and multi-variateanalysis. Suchprocesses, of course,produce results that are muchmore sensitive to dataediting and allocationpractices thanarc the tabulations traditionallyproduced by the CensusBureau. In otherwords,cross tabulations usually haveopen-ended categories.and thesecan containan occa- sional wilderror without appreciableeffect uponany interpretationthat mighthe placed on the centralor modal segment. Notso with moresophisticatedstatistical tools.
It is certainly thecase that there isno reason to ''clean''data beyondthe point of diminishingreturns for tabularanalysis ii that isall you need.But, at the same time,any census bureaumust hesitate toprovide ammunitionfor chal- lenges to its authority;and the possibilitythat the datamight not beabsolutely clean when releasedmust have been quitethreatening. Sincethat time,however, the Bureau hasrelaxed its stanceon release of micro-data,and It isnow possible to get non-disciosurablecopies of the CurrentPopulation Surveytapes. In any case, whenthe data wereturned overto OLO in Mayof 196? they were still well short of'the micro-analyticstandards the OEOsponsors required. Consequently, furtherdata cleaningwas contracted to theBrookings Institution, who, along withAssist Corp.. alsospent at least twiceas much timeon the job as they had anticipated.And. they also,no doubt, relinquishedthe data before being fully satisfied.The Brookings-Assistdata, nowincluding bothannual Surveys were,however, cleanenough in OEO'sopinion to bemade avail- able to researcherson September 3,1969 along withvoluminous (andclear and complete)documentation,describing in detailthe dataon the actualmag- netic tapes.







Further frustrating delays for researchers who had by nowbeen anticipating being
able to use the data for three years. They werefinally able to begin their analyses
in the i'mmer of 1970.
Such work as has been (lone utilizes mainly thecross-sectional aspect of the
SEQ. So far very little work has been done withthe contiiiuous data records from
both years- And there still remain further problemsfor users when the longitudinal
aspects of the data begin to be exploited on awider scale.
Two major problems exist. First, thelongitudinal property of the data lies
in the fact that the same "dwelling unit" wasinterviewed each time. Obviously
this means that the same family may or may nothave been there the second time.
A certain number of records.therefore, are not going to be longitudinal in the
micro-data sense. Before any analysis can he done,explicit account has to be
taken of out-movers and in-movers sothat they. and the truly continuous residents,
can be treatedappropriatelY.
The second problem is common to allmicro-data sets, has to be solved by
every analyst in a waythat best fits his purposes. and is as follows. Evenwhen it
has been ascertained that the "same"family was indeed in the same dwelling unit
both times. it may well be that the compositionof that family has changed (slightly
or drastically). A newchild may be born or there may be a new familyhead, or a
sub-family unit may have been created ordestroyed. There are no obvious general
rules about what changes require one toregard the changed unit as an essentially
new one, but it is necessaryto come up with some rule beforethe data can be
properly used. The protssion has notgiven much thought. hitherto, to the fact
that a decision unit observed at time t maynot exist at t + I or i ± 2 (or may not
have been there at i - I). Butwhen we attempt to use data generatedby real
units over a period of time such aproblem is impossible to ignore. Thesolution,
of course, depends on theconceptual foundations of one's specificanalysis.
This, then. is the story of onerelatively modest effort in the directionof a
data bank. OEO aimed at producing abody of generally useful data(though
focused on their concerns) and Census.Brookings, Assist, and the Poverty
institute have contributed in serialfashion to facilitating their use byresearchers.
it has taken a long while and we arestill short of the goal.
Many of the problems appear tohave been particular and specific tothese
data, but the order of magnitude ofthe problems. and the lack of anypossibility
of' using previously-solved problems toexpedite their solution. are common to
all large micro-data bodies.And the person does not yet existwith the practical
experience required to set up a databank capable of handling such setsof data in
their full generality. There arespecialists who know about onespecific applied
concern, but theirexpertise is not yet transferable to otheron-going data-collection
efforts without a new learning process.
Time lJrbzF! Graduated II Pork IncentiueExperiment
The Graduated Work IncentiveExperiment in New Jersey is a nessdeparture
in social experimentation which wasfunded in the summer of 1967and fielded in
August 1968. About 650families (four sites in urbanNew Jersey and one in
Pennsylvania) are receiving transferpayments of a negative income taxtype, arid
187roughly thesame numberare acting as a controlgroup. Thepayments willcan-
tinuc overa three-year period.We collectincome and lmilv-site
informationfor
the experimentalfamilies everfou! weeksover thepaviUCfltp!0d,and during
this period bothexperimental andcontrol 1unihesare adm;nistercd
(I1 liour-lont
interviewevery three months.
Althoughpayments startedin 1968. itwas not until the
summer of I 9N)that
we were able touse Our automateddata svstenito retrieveany data, aridthe ia
between whenthe informationwas coming in fromthe tick! andwhen itwas
retrievable byresearcherswas on the orderof eightmonths. Sincethat timethe
lag has beenbecoming shorterand shorter,and dataare nowretrievablethat are
only threeor four monthsout of the held. As this shortdescription wiilindicate, the"data-banking"problems facedin
New Jerseyare quite distinctfrom thoseftced inconnection withthe SEO.There
are relatively fewerunits ofobservation, butthe informationon each isvolumi-
nous. First of allthere isinformation fromthirteen hour-longinterviewsover
the three-yearpayment period.These interviewshave thesame fifteen-minutecore
section (on laborsupply) eachtime, but therest of the houris takenup with
questions thatvary from interviewto interview.Some of thevariablesare measured
repeatedly andsome only once.Some of thefamilies getlost--cannot befound or
refuse to be
interviewed--andmost of thefamilies undergoa change incomposi-
tion or residenceor both duringthe periodof observation.Thequestionnaire
structure (skippatterns andquestions askedof differentfamilymembers) is
complex, imposingstringent standardson interviewadministrationand complete-
ness and consistency
checking. Inaddition, thereare four-weeklyrecords ofincome
and experimentalpayments for thepart of thesample receiving"treatments."
Our aim isto producea datasource which isreadily usableby research
personnel. Weare, therefore,concerned thatan analyst beable to drawfreely on
variables fromdifferentsurvey wavesor from othersources in orderto 'compose"
and analyzea simplerectangulararray of data forany sample ofdecision units
that hemay want toexamine. Thissounds likea modest goal,
particularly since
the sameorganization isresponsible bothfor collectingand "banking"the data
in thisease. But nomatter howsimple andultimately feasiblethis taskmay be,
we can onlyproceed withfrustratingslowness. Thereis no fundof experienceto
draw on indesigning andexecuting thekind of datasystem weneedpartly
because thenature of thesample andstudy designare both noveland partlyalso
because thetechnology, softand hard,has beenchangingso rapidly.
Choice ofTechnology
As faras technologyis concerned,I regard itas importantto makean early
and resolutedecision aboutthe kind ofequipment andsystems to beused. The
choice shouldbe madeonlyamong thosealternatives thatare already insuth-
ciently wideuse to ensure(I) thatvalidinformationcan be obtainedon their
performances incomparableapplicationsand(2) that theyhave evolveda rela-
tively stable,bug-free, andoptimal setof softwaresystems. It requiressome determinationto avoid thechoice of thelatest equipment
on the frontier.Suchmachineryalways offersan excitingchallenge to thesystem- 188
aand program-development staff,and the promise is always heldout that the
system eventually evolvedwill be superior to the potentialof the more proven
hardware. But I would emphasize thatthe costs of unforeseendifficulties and
delays are almost always very great.If the aim is to produceresearch in a reason-
able period of time, the temptation topioneer in computer systems mustbe
resisted. Clearly one choice cannot bemade for all time; but the strategyof first
getting a working data facilityand then catching up with thetechnology is the
more prudent ifdelivering research prøducts along the wayis of any importance.
More needs to be said about how anymicro-data system can, in the current
stage of development,be ideally used by a researcher.The speed and cost of
executing a given task of datamanipulation is important in determininghow
much calculation will have tobe done, and this may work in asomewhat perverse
way: i.e., the slowerand more costly it is to make one passof the data file, the
more likely it is that aresearcher will try to anticipate allhis potential needs on
one pass. This strategy canbe only partially successful inreducing future requests,
but it does have adramatic effect on the size ofindividual requests and on the
amount of output accumulated:the more the analyst can replace anexhaustive
set of possible choiceswith a sequence of choicesconditioned upon previous
outcomes, the more unnecessarYcalculation and superfluous output canbe
avoided. Hence the systemshould be designed to encourage asharply-focused
approach, and discouragethe random shots.
The "Data Technician"
Ideally, a data systemwould be so automatic,self-describing, and well
documented, that a researchanalyst could determinewhether (and if so, how)
the data could be usedfor his problem, and be able to carryout the job without
assistance. It may wellbe possible to specify anddesign such a system, and itis
certainly tempting to try andfind one. But such an effort,again, will divert atten-
tion and resources awayfrom getting research donein the near future. The more
feasible approach for the nextseveral years is to use a humanintermediary who
might be called a "datatechnician." The essentialqualifications for such a person
are: (I) theability to communicateeffectively with the researchers onthe one
hand, and with the computertechnicians (operators, programmers,and system
managers) on the other, and (2) ataste for detail thatfacilitates acquiring and
retaining all of the "unwrittendocumentation," which seems tobe an absolute
requirement if one is tobe able to use existingbodies of micro-data. Tothese
might be added the thirdrequirementthe capacity not tobe easily discouraged.
There is now and for theforeseeable future a substantialfixed cost attached
to the "first usage"of a new data set.Without the data specialistdescribed above,
who has become familiarwith the data by strugglingthrough that first use, much
of that cost has to beincurred again by every subsequentuser. Such a datatechni-
cian can work directlywith all users, determiningfirst whether andgenerally how
the data can be used tofill the researcher'sneed, and secondlywhether to carry
out the work him orherself or to train the user todo the job. This latterchoice will
depend on the size andcomplexity of the joband on the user's ability tolearn
enough to do it (oralternatively to pay for theservice of having itdone). But
189without such a person (who iscaller familiar withthe dataor has the
responsibility for becoming so),users will be scared offa new data fIle bythecomplexity of "getting into'' it. And thosewho are not j,ut oIlimmediately willbecome dis- couraged (or impoverished)to the point of abandoningthe effortbefore theyget an results. To repeat: Sucha data-specialist could bedispensed withian ideal "data bank," but for theforeseeable future Ibelieve it to bean indispensable part of any organization thataims at facilitatingthe use ofcomplexiriicrodata sources.
The Use of Still-A ecui,udatiizgData Files
Additional problems andopportunities arcencountered whena body of data is being used while stillin the process ofcollection ---as is thecase with theNegative income Tax data beinggathered in NewJersey. Suchwas (and is) theneed for any information on this subjectthat the datasystem had to become
operational before the eventualdimensions of the database were fixed.Researchproduction and the programmingrelated to it. therefore,compete for timeand budgetwith the development ofthe data systemper se. Files extractedfor analyticuse will become obsoleteas errors are corrected,coding is improved,data areadded, and temporarily lost familiesrecovered. Early resultsmust, therefore,be expectedto be inconsistent(usually in trivialways) with thoseobtained laterin theprocess. Important offsettingadvantages do, however,exist. The factthat data producers. datausers, and system designershave to worktogether reducesthe chance of seriousmistakes--those requiringpart of the basic jobto be doneover again. Interimor preliminary use of thedata results in thediscovery ofproblems and ambiguities intime for revisions,before the difficultyhas beenreplicated throughout the data.In retrospect, forexample, it isquite clear thatthe SEO would have beenavailable in usefulform much earlier(and would infact have been a superiordata set) if therehad been seriousand urgent analyticinterest at the Census Bure:witnm tnegt responsible forproducing theresearch-ready tape.
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is the best way to get started. Again, it may bethat a more direct system can evolve
from this, as the technician finds ways to reduce thenumber of simple and repeti-
tive requests. But there is simply not enough experiencein this area at this lime
for anyone to feel confident about starting outwith an automated system alone.
Finally, I would urge that a data bank be focusedfrom the start on the
needs of specific analystspeople who exist, arealive, and on the Premises. They
must be persuaded to become involved inthe process of system design from the
start; and they must be impatientenough for results to try out and test pieces of
the system and the data file as soon as theybegin to take shape.
All this may sound like a counsel of despair. Thatis not my intent. But,
however ambitious one wants to be inplanning toward some ultimate general
data bank, it is imperative to startsomewhere and get some real work done. The
beginning must be quite modest if we are tomake any progress at all.
Iruing Fisher Research Professor
Yale (]nirersi!v
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